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SENSITIVE  
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TOKYO FOR AYANNA HOBBS  
NSC FOR MARY ALICE HAYWARD AND PAUL BROWN

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [KNNP](#) [CBW](#) [TRGY](#) [GM](#) [JA](#) [RS](#) [CA](#) [UK](#) [FR](#)  
SUBJECT: JANUARY 30 MEETING OF THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP  
WORKING GROUP IN TOKYO

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The first G-8 Global Partnership Working Group meeting (GPWG) of the Japanese G-8 Presidency, which took place on January 30, 2008 in Tokyo, focused on expanding the geographic scope of GP activities and developing benchmarks to ensure that current pledges for GP projects in Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU) are met by 2012. Except for Russia, all G-8 nations were supportive of GP geographic expansion, with some GP nations - such as Germany ) noting its need to obtain legislative authority to enable it to spend GP money outside Russia and other FSU nations. Russia strenuously objected to GP expansion, citing its strong belief that GP expansion will come at the expense of current GP commitments in Russia. Japan continued to stress the importance of discussing GP expansion and also agreed to address the critical issue of new GP donor outreach during upcoming sessions. Japan also accepted the U.S. offer of a threat briefing in March on specific areas of concern, while also agreeing to address implementation issues in Russia through a working paper outlining benchmarks for 2008-2012 and cataloguing specific implementation issues to spur project completion. END SUMMARY.

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JAPAN PLANS TO LEND STRONG SUPPORT FOR DECLARING  
GP EXPANDED AT THE 2008 G-8 SUMMIT IN HOKKAIDO  
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¶2. (SBU) In a breakfast meeting prior to the GPWG, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Yasanuri Morino spoke about extensive contributions GP nations are already making to reduce the WMD threat outside of Russia and Ukraine, the only two formal GP recipient nations. He agreed with U.S. GPWG representative, NSC Director for Counterproliferation Strategy Mary Alice Hayward, stating that the GP has, in fact, already expanded. Morino seemed to also support listing GP nation contributions beyond Russia and Ukraine in the 2008 GP documents. He further agreed that expansion should be extremely flexible and supported U.S. suggestions to reach out to new GP donors in 2008 and provide a threat briefing at the next GPWG. The intent of the threat briefing would be to highlight specific global WMD threats that could be addressed under an expanded GP, outlining, where possible,

specific projects that could reduce the threat. Finally, Morino gave preliminary consideration to the U.S. proposal for the G-8 to support the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), a concept developed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), with support from the U.S. Department of Energy and the IAEA, for sharing nuclear security best practices, particularly among facility operators. Morino said that he would consider a further briefing on WINS at a later GPWG meeting in 2008.

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Canada and UK: Full Steam Ahead on Expansion  
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13. (SBU) Canada and the UK continue to strongly support GP geographic expansion and eventual extension beyond 2012. The UK already has authority to spend GP funds beyond the FSU and partners with the U.S. to engage and redirect former WMD personnel in Iraq and Libya. Canada does not yet have approval from its Treasury Board to spend GP funds outside the FSU, but is likely to receive that authority sometime in 2008. During a trilateral meeting with Canada and the UK prior to the GPWG, all delegates agreed with U.S. primary objectives for 2008, which are to: 1) Achieve concrete Leaders, language at the Hokkaido Summit declaring the geographic expansion of the GP; 2) Count GP contributions to global WMD threat reduction beyond Russia and other FSU nations in the 2008 GP Summit documents; 3) Add new GP donors for 2008; and 4) Continue to stand firm in our commitments to make good on current Kananaskis pledges in Russia/FSU. In addition, Canada and the UK pressed for final Summit language to include mention of GP extension beyond 2012, recognizing that many nations will need a long lead time to amend legislation, to allow GP spending beyond Russia and the FSU.

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Russian Opposition Remains Strong; Japan Stresses  
GP has already Expanded in Fact  
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14. (U) Japan opened the GPWG meeting by outlining its planned program of GP work for 2008, which strongly supports two main focus areas: 1) Setting benchmarks for completion of Kananaskis goals by 2012; and 2) Expanding the geographic scope of the GP and counting current financial commitments beyond Russia and Ukraine. Prior to the January 30 GPWG, Japan began its GPWG chairmanship by asking GP nations to list WMD threat-reduction activities beyond Russia and Ukraine. In response, G-8 nations and the EU highlighted WMD threat reduction efforts beyond Russia and the FSU, providing momentum for the G-8 to declare that the GP has, in fact, already expanded. Many nations are making modest contributions in the area of WMD threat reduction outside of the FSU, with the U.S., UK, and EU having the largest amount of activity. In FY 2007, the U.S. committed approximately 350 million USD for global WMD threat reduction programs plus an additional 70 million USD in support of international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other activities in support of international WMD nonproliferation regimes. Japan laid out several questions for further consideration in the run-up to the Summit, including: 1) whether/how to invite new donors; 2) whether emphasis should be placed on any specific geographic region; 3) whether an expanded GP should place priority on specific areas of work; and 4) how closely should an expanded GP be tied with other activities, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and other multilateral instruments.

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Don,t Blame Mr. Rozhkov  
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15. (SBU) The first half of the meeting focused on implementation of current GP projects. Russian Representative Anatoliy Antonov strongly opposed expansion, harking back to Russia's sentiments in the run-up to the 2007 Summit at Heiligendamm and in sharp contrast to Russia's more laid-back approach toward expansion at the October 2007 GPWG in Berlin. While giving lip service to geographic expansion, Antonov took every opportunity to point the finger at G-8 nations, which have fallen short on their Kananaskis pledges for projects in Russia (Italy, Japan and France in particular) as a reason why Russia believes expansion is premature. Antonov outlined specific conversations he had internally (with Rosatom and Rosprom) about the status of current GP-funded projects to complete nuclear submarine dismantlement and chemical weapons destruction, and he called on G-8 nations to be honest with Russia about the reality of their outstanding commitments so that Russia can plan its own budget to complete this work, including work required under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Deputy Foreign Minister Kisylak had foreshadowed this stance in his January 24, 2008 letter to Japanese Deputy Minister and Political Director Sasae; however, it was clear that Japan was surprised by the strength of Russian opposition relative to previous bilateral meetings and milder Russian sentiment at the October GPWG in Berlin. In his opening remarks, Antonov also made it clear that Russia's GPWG representative for the remainder of 2008 will be Oleg Roshkov (who Antonov said reports to him). However, Antonov stressed that the GPWG should not blame Roshkov, because he will be under very strict instructions from Moscow (presumably to place roadblocks to GP expansion).

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Russia: Show me the (rest of the) money  
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16. (SBU) Antonov stated that the U.S. is clearly meeting its Kananaskis commitments, but noted that the U.S. had already been spending 1 billion USD per year prior to 2002 and the GP was supposed to be about new projects. While the U.S., Canada and Germany largely escaped Russia's criticism, Antonov stated that Russia has had no cooperation at all with Italy on GP projects (NOTE: Italy has not obligated or spent most of its 1 billion Euro GP Pledge. END NOTE.) Antonov also called Japan's timeline for dismantling nuclear submarines into question, stating that Japan had dismantled only two submarines in five years. He also asked where the EU pledge money has gone and what France has done with its pledge. While not citing specific issues with the UK, Antonov also asked the UK to sit down with Russia to discuss differences. (NOTE: the UK recently told Russia it will not be able to conduct previously planned chemical weapons destruction work at Kizner, though the money set aside for Kizner would continue to be made available for other GP projects in Russia. END NOTE.)

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Solutions, Please ) Not Problems  
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17. (SBU) In a partially successful effort to bring Russia's complaining during the first half of the meeting to a close, U.S. Representative Hayward called for all nations to submit a brief catalogue of implementation problems for consideration at the next GPWG, with an emphasis on how problems may be resolved. Japan agreed to this action item, which will also include asking GP nations to agree on a list of benchmarks for 2008-2012 to ensure that current commitments are met. On the meeting margins,

Canada and the U.S. tried to underscore with Russia the importance of concrete solutions rather than non-specific roadblocks and also tried to emphasize the need for the GP to resolve implementation issues in parallel with expansion. These arguments appeared to fall on deaf ears.

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Germany: Unlikely to Obstruct Expansion  
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18. (SBU) Germany disappointed the U.S. in the run-up to Heiligendamm by showing little to no support for immediate GP geographic expansion. However, during the January 2008 GPWG, German representative Dietrich Becker stated that, while Germany does not have any immediate plans or authorities to spend GP funds outside of Russia, it is now prepared to not object to inclusion of new GP recipients worldwide under a flexible GP expansion. Germany also noted the practical benefit of GP expansion in the near-term for nations that do not yet have authorization to spend GP funds globally. Becker emphasized that the legislature in Germany (and in other nations) is already considering budgets for 2009 and 2010 and would need to consider adding funding for projects beyond Russia and other FSU nations as soon as possible. USDEL notes that if nations are not prepared to provide funding for GP activities beyond 2012, the GP could face the possibility of addressing its expansion in 2012 with no real funding for global projects available until 2014 or 2015. USDEL plans to meet with Germany bilaterally prior to the March GPWG to gain a better understanding of what Germany is prepared to support in terms of specific Summit deliverables on GP expansion and extension.

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Italy: Not Opposed to Expansion,  
but no Additional Funds Likely  
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19. (SBU) Italian delegate Gianluca Alberini, new to the GPWG this year, stated that Italy will make good on its heretofore not expended GP pledge. He also made it clear on the margins that Italy does not oppose the concept of GP expansion, but that for Italy to fund GP projects outside of Russia/FSU would mean a dilution of Italy's Kananaskis pledge. USDEL plans to hold bilateral consultations with Italy in Washington prior to the March GPWG to gain a better understanding about the roadblocks to Italy spending its current pledge and financing additional projects worldwide to reduce the global WMD threat.

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EU: New Cash to Support Expansion;  
France: Supports flexibility in an expanded GP  
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110. (U) EU representative Luigi Narbone stated that the EU is already spending funds to reduce the global WMD threat in areas such as preventing nuclear trafficking and strengthening export controls. The EU is already planning beyond 2012 and is particularly interested in utilizing new funding under the EU stability instrument to deepen activities in other parts of the world, including specific focus in the area of biosafety and biosecurity. French representative Jean-Hugue Simon-Michel stated that new threats must be taken into account and stressed that the GP should avoid too rigid a framework for expansion.

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New Donors: Cash cows for an expanded GP  
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¶11. (SBU) U.S. rep Hayward stated that most previous G-8 Leaders statements on nonproliferation prior to Heiligendamm included additional new donors for the GP. Most nations agreed that new donors would be critical under an expanded GP. The UK floated a proposal where an expanded GP could include two classes of new donors: 1) Aspiring global players with increasing economic clout, such as Brazil, Mexico, China and India, and 2) Sovereign Wealth Fund nations, such as UAE, Kuwait, and Singapore. The U.S. plans to suggest a notional list of potential new GP donors to be invited to an expanded session of the April GPWG meeting to include: Spain, Saudi Arabia, India, China, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Morocco.

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Global Partnership: Synergy with Global Initiative  
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¶12. (U) During the course of the GPWG, Germany and Russia expressed their confusion about how an expanded GP would differ from or complement the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (Global Initiative), which the U.S. co-chairs with Russia and which includes all G-8 nations plus 57 others. Germany proposed merging the two initiatives, and Russia mentioned their confusion about why GP geographic expansion would be needed in light of the global focus of the Global Initiative. Hayward made it clear that, while activities financed by the GP could be complementary to meeting key objectives of the Global Initiative, the GP and Global Initiative should remain separate. She went on to explain that the added value of an expanded GP is its mechanism for financing activities to meet key goals under

the Global Initiative ) as well as activities to combat chemical and biological threats not addressed under the GI.

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Russia says &thanks, but no thanks8 to GP efforts to improve biosafety and biosecurity in Russia  
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¶13. (SBU) During the course of the GPWG, several nations mentioned the importance of funding projects to improve biosafety and biosecurity under the GP. Following a statement by the UK in support of consideration for new projects in Russia, including in the area of biosafety and biosecurity. Antonov defiantly stated, &we have enough money for biosafety and biosecurity ) forget about it.8 He then went on to assure the G-8 that there are no biological weapons in the Russian Federation and stated that these kinds of issues are serious and under the mandate of the United Nations Security Council. (NOTE: Despite this and other strong statements from Russian MFA, the U.S. does have ongoing cooperation with Russian institutes on biosafety and biosecurity projects). This issue again came up in the January 31 Nonproliferation Directors Group meeting (NPDG) (septel), when Antonov referenced that Russia had not been admitted to the Australia Group, which may be a major reason for his reluctance to discuss these issues in either G-8 forum.

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February GPWG Cancelled; Next steps toward an expanded GP for March  
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¶14. (U) Japan wrapped up the GPWG by outlining a plan of action for the next GPWG, which representatives agreed should be on March 26

prior to the next NPDG meeting, rather than at the end of February as previously agreed. In advance of the March 26 GPWG, which will include all GP nations, Japan asked G-8 participants to: 1) Contribute suggestions for new GP donors; 2) Outline potential benchmarks for the GP to meet Kananaskis commitments by 2012; and 3) Catalogue challenges to meeting current commitments in Russia and Ukraine. Japan also called upon the U.S. and other nations to contribute threat briefings for the March meeting.

¶15. (SBU) Prior to the March 26 GPWG, the U.S. intends to encourage Japan to emphasize bilateral solutions for the catalogue of challenges, in order to ensure that the March GPWG is not diluted. The U.S. also intends to offer Japan the concept of a web portal for the GP to catalogue achievements and needs ) an idea also supported by Canada and the UK. It will also revisit the question of a possible WINS briefing. The U.S. will also hold bilateral consultations with Italy, France, Germany and Russia in the upcoming weeks to explore ways to move ahead on stalled Kananaskis commitments, including offering U.S. expert assistance where appropriate. Finally, the U.S. will prepare a threat briefing and will reach out to other nations (as appropriate and in consultation with Japan) for additional briefings. For example, Australia is spending WMD threat reduction funds in Southeast Asia and may be able to deliver an enlightening briefing on threat in that region.  
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